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BYSTANDER DISTRESS AND LOSS OF CONSORTIUM:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP
REQUIREMENTS IN LIGHT OF
ROMER V. EVANS
Laura M. Raisty
INTRODUCTION
In San Francisco, two individuals were crossing the street together
to catch the number 19 Polk Street bus.1 The first individual noticed
the bus approaching and bearing down upon them. He then realized
the bus was not going to stop, and attempted to pull his companion to
safety. His efforts failed, however, and he stood by watching help-
lessly as the bus ran over his companion, inflicting critical injuries.
Some time later, the uninjured party commenced an action against the
bus driver for negligent infliction of emotional distress, having suf-
fered great distress from witnessing this accident and the resulting
harm to his loved one.
The seminal case Dillon v. Legg governs whether a bystander may
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress ("bystander dis-
tress") in California. At first blush, the above plaintiff's case for by-
stander distress seems to satisfy the Dillon criteria:3 plaintiff was
present at the scene of the accident; plaintiff's observation of the acci-
dent was simultaneous with the actual accident, and; the relationship
between plaintiff and the injured individual was extremely close-
plaintiff had been living with the injured individual for a year, they
shared a stable, emotionally significant, and intimate relationship, and
they had agreed to live as "exclusive life partners."
Nonetheless, in a similar California case, both the trial and appel-
late courts held that the plaintiff could not state an action for by-
stander distress.4 Why? Because the two individuals were gay men
living together as life partners. The appellate court held that their
homosexual relationship could not constitute a relationship that
would satisfy the Dillon criteria.5 The court, however, was similarly
clear that a heterosexual couple in the same situation could allege a de
1. This hypothetical is a composite of the facts of Coon v. Joseph. 237 Cal. Rptr.
873, 874 (Ct. App. 1987), and Trombetta v. Conkling, 626 N.E.2d 653, 653-54 (N.Y.
1993).
2. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
3. Dillon sets out three factors to determine whether a bystander can recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress: (1) the bystander must be near the scene of
the accident; (2) the distress must result from a contemporaneous observation of the
accident; and (3) the bystander must be closely related to the victim. Id. at 920; see
infra text accompanying note 55. For a more detailed discussion of the Dillon criteria,
see text accompanying infra notes 54-58.
4. Coon, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
5. Id. at 877-78.
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facto marriage, which, if proven, would satisfy Dillon's close relation-
ship requirement.6
Most jurisdictions (including California) permit a plaintiff who has a
sufficiently close relationship with an injured party to recover for by-
stander distress or loss of consortium. 7 Although unmarried heter-
osexuals have, on occasion, been successful in these actions, no
jurisdiction currently recognizes the standing of homosexuals to assert
the causes of action.8 In considering the relationship requirements,
courts typically weigh several factors in deciding whether a relation-
ship satisfies the requirements: the state's interest in protecting mar-
riage, the need to limit liability, and the potential burden on the
courts.9 In addition, some courts focus on the state's interest in pro-
moting a familial relationship, rather than the actual existence of mar-
ital, blood, or adoptive ties. 10 Regardless of the focus or
considerations, no court has held that a homosexual relationship satis-
fies the relationship requirements for loss of consortium or bystander
distress.
This Note argues that precluding a stable and significant homosex-
ual partnership from satisfying the relationship requirements for by-
stander distress or loss of consortium violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Part I of this Note explores
the development and background of the torts of loss of consortium
and bystander distress, with emphasis on the establishment of the re-
spective relationship requirements. Part II discusses the policy factors
and rationales courts give to explain the judicially created relationship
restrictions for loss of consortium and bystander distress. Part III con-
tends that the relationship requirements are judicially created classifi-
cations that violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,' 2 to the extent that depriving homosexuals these rights
of action does not pass the rational relationship scrutiny dictated by
Romer v. Evans.'3 Part IV proposes that a stable and significant rela-
6. l ("[An] allegation [of a de facto marriage cannot] be made because appel-
lant and [his companion] are both males and the Legislature has made a determina-
tion that a legal marriage is between a man and a woman."). In Ledger v. Tippitt, 210
Cal. Rptr. 814, 828 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled by Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal.
1988) (en banc), the court held that a de facto marriage could satisfy the close rela-
tionship requirement. This case had not been overruled when Coon was decided, and
therefore was valid precedent at that time.
7. See infra notes 23-24, 59-60, 63 and accompanying text for surveys of the states
recognizing causes of action for loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress to a bystander.
8. Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1508, 1620-21 (1989) [hereinafter Developments].
9. See Elden, 758 P.2d at 586-88.
10. See Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 373-76 (NJ. 1994).
11. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Id
13. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). For a discussion of the Romer rational relationship test,
see infra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
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tionship is sufficient to satisfy the relationship requirements, and ar-
gues that the proposed standard would pass the Romer rational
relationship test. Accordingly, this Note concludes that courts should
adopt this stable and significant relationship standard to satisfy the
relationship requirements for loss of consortium and bystander dis-
tress. This standard would pass the Romer rational relationship test,
allow participants in stable and significant relationships, including
homosexuals, to recover for emotional injuries, and recognize the
more modem version of family.
I. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORTS OF Loss OF
CONSORTIUM AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS TO A BYSTANDER
Loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress to
a bystander are torts that compensate an individual for harm done to
another. To recover for either of these torts, a certain relationship
must exist between the plaintiff and the injured party. This section
will examine the development of these torts, discussing their require-
ments and their prevalence in jurisdictions today.
A. Loss of Consortium
The loss of consortium tort is meant to compensate an individual
for the loss of another's "society, guidance, companionship, and sex-
ual relations."' 4 Historically, the right of action for loss of consortium
was available only to husbands, based on both a property interest1 5
and a relational interest.16 The emphasis was originally on the prop-
erty interest, focusing on the wife's status as the husband's property;
accordingly, any injury to the wife was an economic injury to her hus-
band.'7 In contrast, the relational interest results from "the relation in
14. Black's Law Dictionary 309 (6th ed. 1990); see also Millington v. Southeastern
Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897, 899 (N.Y. 1968) (defining consortium as "embrac[ing]
such elements as love, companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, solace and
more").
15. See Comment, Limiting the Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium, 66 Cal. L
Rev. 430, 432 (1978) [hereinafter Limiting the Cause of Action]; see also Martin v.
Southern Pac. Co., 62 P. 515, 515 (Cal. 1900) (discussing injury to a wife as economic
injury to property).
16. Laurie J. Barsella, Comment, Negligent Injury to Family Relationships: A Re-
evaluation of the Logic of Liability, 77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 794, 796 (1983); see, e.g., Chi-
cago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Honey, 63 F. 39,42 (8th Cir. 1894) ("[T]he husband's right to
sue for loss of society and services grows out of the marital relation, and is incident to
the rights thereby acquired.").
17. Limiting the Cause of Action, supra note 15, at 432; Kelly M. Martin, Note,
Loss of Consortium: Should California Protect Cohabitants' Relational Interest?, 58 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1467, 1468-69 (1985); see e.g., Martin, 62 P. at 515 (stating that a wife's
services are community property).
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which the plaintiff stands toward one or more third persons."' 8 To
protect the relational interest, courts recognize a tort for interference
with the continuation of the relationship. 1" As society's norms and
values evolved, the law's focus shifted from the proprietary interest to
the relational interest.20
As a result of this shift, wives received the right of action for loss of
consortium. In the landmark case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,21 the
D.C. Circuit Court first recognized a wife's cause of action for loss of
consortium. The Hitaffer court recognized that "[tihe husband owes
the same degree of love, affection, felicity, etc., to the wife as she to
him.... [I]t would be a judicial fiat for us to say that a wife may not
have an action for loss of consortium .. . ."I Currently the majority
of the states recognize the cause of action for both wives and hus-
bands,23 although several jurisdictions do not recognize the cause of
18. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 124, at 915
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser]; see Butcher v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503,
506 (Ct. App. 1983), overruled by Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988) (en
bane).
19. Butcher, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 506 (quoting Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165, 167
(Me. 1980)).
20. Comment, Extending Consortium Rights to Unmarried Cohabitants, 129 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 911, 917, 920-21 (1981) [hereinafter Extending Consortium Rights].
21. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
22. Id. at 819 (emphasis omitted).
23. The right to recover for loss of a spouse's consortium is recognized in 47 states
and the District of Columbia. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-209 (1987); La. Civ. Code
Ann. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1997); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 167-A (West 1981)(repealed as of Oct. 1, 1997); Miss. Code. Ann. § 93-3-1 (1972); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 507(8-a) (1983); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 214 (West 1990); Or. Rev. Stat. § 108.010(1990); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-75-20 (Law. Co-op. 1977); Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-1-106
(1980); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5431 (Supp. 1996); W. Va. Code § 48-3-19a (1996);
Ouachita Nat'l Bank v. Tosco Corp., 686 F.2d 1291, (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Arkan-
sas law), modified, 716 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1983) (en bane); Luther v. Maple, 250 F.2d
916 (8th Cir. 1958) (applying Nebraska law); Johnson v. United States, 496 F. Supp.
597 (D. Mont. 1980) (applying Montana law), modified, 704 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1983);
Williams v. Alabama Neon Sign Co., 304 So. 2d 895 (Ala. 1974); Schreiner v. Fruit,
519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974); City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 503 P.2d 803 (Ariz. 1972)
(en banc); Pesce v. Summa Corp., 126 Cal. Rptr. 451 (Ct. App. 1975); Lee v. Colorado
Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); Hopson v. Saint Mary's Hosp.,
408 A.2d 260 (Conn. 1979); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 484 A.2d 527 (Del. Super. Ct.
1984); Romer v. District of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1097 (D.C. 1982); Gates v. Foley, 247
So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971); Smith v. Tri-State Culvert Mfg. Co., 191 S.E.2d 92 (Ga. Ct. App.
1972); Towse v. State, 647 P.2d 696 (Haw. 1982); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 519 P.2d 421
(Idaho 1974); Kolar v. City of Chicago, 299 N.E.2d 479 (IlM. App. Ct. 1973); Troue v.
Marker, 252 N.E.2d 800 (Ind. 1969); Childers v. McGee, 306 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa 1981);
Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970); Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 231 A.2d 514
(Md. 1967); Olsen v. Bell Tel. Lab., Inc., 445 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1983); Montgomery v.
Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1960); Dawydowycz v. Quady, 220 N.W.2d 478(Minn. 1974); Tribble v. Gregory, 288 So. 2d 13 (Miss. 1974); Novak v. Kansas City
Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963) (en banc); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 498
P.2d 366 (Nev. 1972); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Bisson, 449 A.2d 1226 (N.H. 1982);
Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp., 215 A.2d 1 (NJ. 1965); Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d
840 (N.M. 1994); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y.
2650 [Vol. 65
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action at all.24
Beginning in the 1980s, some courts began to recognize another ex-
pansion of the consortium tort, allowing children to sue for loss of
parental consortium. The first case allowing this cause of action was
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.'s The Ferriter court allowed a
man's children to state a claim for "loss of parental society... [if they
could prove] economic requirements.... [and] filial needs for close-
ness, guidance, and nurture."26 Other states have followed Ferriter's
lead, either recognizing the cause of action by statute or common
law.27 A parent's claim for loss of consortium, where permitted, is
more difficult to establish, and usually involves a very serious injury to
the child. 8 In Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Court,29 where
an adult child had suffered severe brain damage, the court held that
the parents had a cause of action for loss of consortium against a party
who negligently injured their child.3" An increasing number of states
have recognized a parent's cause of action for loss of consortium of a
child, and the trend seems to be to allow this cause of action.31 Sev-
eral states, however, have considered the parental claim for loss of
consortium and have rejected it.32
Another expansion of the consortium tort occurred for a brief pe-
1968); Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., Inc., 266 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 1980);
Hastings v. James River Aerie No. 2337-Fraternal Order of Eagles, 246 N.W2d 747
(N.D. 1976); Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 258 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio
1970); Middlebrook v. Imler, Tenny & Kugler, M.D.'s, Inc., 713 P.2d 572 (Okla. 1985);
Snodgrass v. General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, 549 P.2d 1120 (Or. 1976); Hopkins v.
Blanco, 320 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1974); Mariani v. Nanni, 185 A.2d 119 (R.I. 1962); Hoek-
stra v. Helgeland, 98 N.W.2d 669 (S.D. 1959); Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.V.2d 665
(Tex. 1978); Whitney v. Fisher, 417 A.2d 934 (Vt. 1980); Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc.,
614 P.2d 1272 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); King v. Bittinger, 231 S.E.2d 239 (W. Va. 1976);
Peeples v. Sargent, 253 N.W.2d 459 (Wis. 1977); Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361
(Wyo. 1986).
24. Utah, Virginia, and Kansas do not recognize a cause of action for loss of
consortium. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-4 (1953); Va. Code Ann. § 55-36 (Michie
1950); Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 647 P.2d 1263 (Kan. 1982).
25. 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980).
26. Il at 696.
27. Michael A. MogiU, And Justice for Some: Assessing the Need to Recognize the
Child's Action for Loss of Parental Consortium, 24 Ariz. St. LJ. 1321, 1321-22 (1992).
As of 1992, twelve states, including Massachusetts, had recognized the cause of action
at common law, and three states have recognized the cause of action by statute. Id. at
1321-22 & nn.2-3.
28. Prosser, supra note 18, § 125, at 130 nA9.5 (Supp. 1988).
29. 722 P.2d 955 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc).
30. Id. at 961.
31. Roy C. Howell, The Parental Claim for Loss of Consortium Resulting from the
Negligent Injury of a Child, 19 S.U. L. Rev. 313, 318 (1992). Fifteen states had recog-
nized this cause of action as of 1992. Id. at 318-19.
32. Id, at 319-20. Fourteen states had rejected this cause of action as of 1992,
although many jurisdictions had not addressed the issue. Id. at 319.
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riod in the mid-1980s, when California, in Butcher v. Superior Court,33
allowed an unmarried cohabitant to state a cause of action by showing
a "stable and significant [relationship] ... parallel to the marital rela-
tionship."'  Five years later, however, the California Supreme Court
overruled this decision in Elden v. Sheldon,35 holding that only mar-
ried people have the right of action for injury to a spouse. 6 Thus, in
states recognizing loss of consortium, the cause of action is available
only to the spouse, parent, or child of the injured party, depending on
the jurisdiction.37
B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
In contrast to the growing acceptance of loss of consortium as a
compensable tort, courts generally have been reluctant to award dam-
ages for emotional distress, particularly when the distress resulted
from a negligent act.38 This section first discusses the approaches
courts employ when a plaintiff claims distress suffered as a result of
peril to the plaintiff himself, and then discusses the approaches used in
assessing negligent infliction of emotional distress to a bystander.
During the last century, courts have recognized mental distress as a
compensable tort when such distress is inflicted intentionally.39 The
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, however, has not
achieved this same level of recognition and uniformity.4 0 At first,
courts permitted recovery only when the plaintiff suffered a contem-
poraneous physical impact.4 This rule, known as the "impact rule,"
bases recovery for distress on whether the plaintiff suffered any physi-
cal contact at the time of injury.42 Courts typically relied on the im-
pact rule to deter fraudulent claims.43
33. 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1983), overruled by Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d
582 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
34. Butcher, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
35. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
36. Id at 588.
37. See supra notes 23-24, 27, 31 and accompanying text.
38. Anne E. Simerman, Note, The Right of a Cohabitant to Recover in Tort:
Wrongful Death, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Loss of Consortium,
32 U. Louisville J. Faro. L. 531, 534 (1994).
39. Thomas T. Uhl, Note, Bystander Emotional Distress: Missing an Opportunity
to Strengthen the 7es that Bind, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 1399, 1410 (1995).
40. Id. at 1410-11.
41. See Dennis G. Bassi, Note, It's All Relative: A Graphical Reasoning Model for
Liberalizing Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Beyond the Imme-
diate Family, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 913, 921-22 (1996); Nicholas M. Coquillard, Note,
Negligent HIV Testing and False-Positive Plaintiffs: Pardoning the Traditional Prereq.
uisites for Emotional Distress Recovery, 43 Clev. St. L. Rev. 655, 668-69 (1995).
42. See David Sampedro, When Living as Husband and Wife Isn't Enough:
Reevaluating Dillon's Close Relationship Test in Light of Dunphy v. Gregor, 25 Stet-
son L. Rev. 1085, 1093-94 (1996).
43. Id. at 1094.
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Over time, however, most jurisdictions abandoned the impact rule
in favor of the "zone of danger" rule." In order to recover under this
rule, the plaintiff must be within the immediate vicinity of the acci-
dent.a" The defendant's act must physically endanger the plaintiff, but
the act need not ultimately result in physical impact. Thus, if the
plaintiff suffered emotional distress and was within the allowable area
or "range of apprehension,"' he could recover for that emotional dis-
tress.47 If the plaintiff suffers emotional distress that has physical con-
sequences, most courts allow recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.8 This permits a plaintiff to recovery for fear she
suffers when the defendant's conduct threatens her own safety;
although the distress may need to be physically manifested, it need
not result from actual physical contact.
Courts have employed several different approaches when a plaintiff
tries to recover for distress resulting from a defendant's acts which
harm or injure others. This is known as bystander distress. A few
jurisdictions rely on the impact rule to bar claims for a bystander's
mental disturbance upon witnessing injury to another.49 Under the
impact rule, a plaintiff may not recover for mental distress unless she
suffered an accompanying personal injury.50 In these few states, be-
cause a bystander does not suffer any personal injury, she would be
unable to recover for mental distress.5 '
44. Id at 1096-98.
45. See Uhl, supra note 39, at 1412.
46. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y.), reh'g denied, 164
N.E. 564 (N.Y. 1928).
47. See Sampedro, supra note 42, at 1096-97.
48. See, eg., Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 13, 17 (NJ. 1965) (allowing recovery
for emotional distress by a pedestrian who was almost struck by a car). But see Ander-
son v. Scheffler, 752 P.2d 667, 669 (Kan. 1988) (holding that general physical symp-
toms such as insomnia and headaches do not support a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress). Not all jurisdictions require physical manifestations
of distress, if the situation is such that mental distress was the normal human reaction.
Jurisdictions that have abandoned the physical manifestation requirement include
California, Connecticut, and New Jersey. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616
P.2d 813, 820 (CaL 1980) (en banc); Montinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 398
A.2d 1180, 1184 (Conn. 1978); Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 527-28 (NJ. 1980).
49. Prosser, supra note 18, § 54, at 365. See infra note 63 for a list of jurisdictions
following the impact rule.
50. See Scheffler, 752 P.2d at 669.
51. See, e.g., Selfe v. Smith, 397 So. 2d 348, 350 (Fla. App.) (plaintiff, a passenger
in a truck in a collision, was denied recovery for mental distress suffered upon wit-
nessing injury to her child based upon the impact rule, as plaintiff could recover only
for distress due to plaintiff's own injury), review denied, 407 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1981);
Carlinville Nat'l Bank v. Rhoads, 380 N.E.2d 63, 65 (MII. App. CL 1978) (applying
impact rule and declining to recognize cause of action for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress for woman who witnessed husband's death in car accident, when dis-
tress did not arise from a contemporaneous injury to plaintiff. but was caused by
witnessing injury to another). It is worth noting, however, that courts may stretch this
doctrine to find "impact," and allow the plaintiff to recover. For instance, in Com-
stock v. Wilson, 177 N.E. 431, 431, 434 (N.Y. 1931), a court found the required impact
26531997]
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Most states, however, allow recovery for a bystander's distress typi-
cally under either the zone of danger rule or the bystander proximity
test.52 The zone of danger rule is the approach embodied in the Sec-
ond Restatement of Torts.53 This rule denies recovery for mental dis-
tress unless the defendant's conduct had threatened the plaintiff
himself with physical injury. If the plaintiff had been in the zone of
danger, is a member of the injured party's "immediate family," and
has suffered distress, he may have a cause of action for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress.
The California Supreme Court departed from the zone of danger
test and developed the bystander proximity test in the landmark case
of Dillon v. Legg.54 In Dillon, the court allowed a mother and sister
who witnessed the death of a child to recover for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. The sister was in the zone of danger, but the
mother was not. The Dillon court set out a three-part test to deter-
mine if a plaintiff could assert the cause of action:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as
contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether
the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff
from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident,
as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its oc-
currence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as
contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of
only a distant relationship.55
The California Supreme Court modified Dillon in Thing v.
LaChusa.56 In Thing, the mother of an accident victim sought to re-
cover for distress she suffered upon arriving at the scene of an acci-
dent in which a car struck her child. The court denied the mother
recovery, because she had not actually seen the car hit her son. The
Thing court modified the Dillon guidelines, addressing concerns about
"widening circles of liability."57 The court established a narrower test
for bystander proximity, holding that a plaintiff may recover for by-
stander distress,
if, but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim;
(2) is present at the scene of the injury producing event at the time
it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and
(3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress-a reaction beyond
in a fall suffered when the plaintiff fainted after a collision. Most jurisdictions, how-
ever, have abandoned the impact rule. See infra note 63 for a list of jurisdictions still
adhering to the impact rule.
52. Prosser, supra note 18, § 54, at 366.
53. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436 (3) & cmt. f (1965).
54. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
55. Id. at 920 (emphasis added).
56. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
57. Id at 819.
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that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which
is not an abnormal response to the circumstances.58
Most states have followed the California Supreme Court's Dillon
decision, and have abandoned the zone of danger and impact tests in
favor of some version of the bystander proximity test.5 9 Several
states, however, still follow the zone of danger test,' positing that this
test allows recovery for distress with sufficient limitations. These ju-
risdictions find the zone of danger test palatable because the defend-
ant has "violated an original duty to the plaintiff" (by putting the
plaintiff in danger of physical injury),6 1 and the distress suffered is
"merely a matter of the unexpected manner in which the foreseeable
harm has occurred."'6 2 Only few jurisdictions still retain the impact
rule, denying recovery to anyone who was not directly physically af-
fected by defendant's conduct.
63
58. Id. at 829-30 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
59. Currently, twenty six jurisdictions have adopted Dillon's bystander proximity
text in some form. See Croft v. Wicker, 737 P2d 789 (Alaska 1987); Thing v. LaChusa,
771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989) (en banc); Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A2d 852 (Conn. 1996);
Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw.
1974); F'meran v. Pickett, 465 N.W.2d 662 (Iowa 1991); Lejeune v. Rayne Branch
Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990); Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279 (Me. 1992); Stock-
dale v. Bird & Son, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 951 (Mass. 1987); Nugent v. Bauermeister, 489
N.W.2d 148 (Mich. CL App. 1992), appeal denied, 503 N.W.2d 904 (Mich. 1993); En-
tex, Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982); Maguire v. State, 835 P.2d 755
(Mont. 1992); James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109 (Neb. 1985); Buck v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 783 P.2d 437 (Nev. 1989); Wilder v. City of Keene, 557 A.2d 636 (N.H. 1989);
Frame v. Kothari, 560 A.2d 675 (NJ. 1989); Folz v. State, 797 P.2d 246 (N.M. 1990);
Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 395 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. 1990); Paugh
v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1983); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979); Reilly v.
United States, 547 A.2d 894 (RI. 1988); Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 336
S.E.2d 465 (S.C. 1985); Freeman v. City of Pasadena, 744 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1988);
Gain v. Carroll M fill Co., 787 P.2d 553 (Wash. 1990) (en banc); Heldreth v. Marrs, 425
S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1992); Contreras v. Carbon County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 843 P.2d 589
(Wyo. 1992).
60. The zone of danger test is followed in fourteen jurisdictions. See Keck v. Jack-
son, 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979) (en banc); Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 (Colo.
1978) (en banc); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 210 A.2d 709 (DeL 1965); Williams
v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062 (D.C. 1990) (en banc); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457
N.E.2d I (Ml1. 983); Resavage v. Davies, 86 A2d 879 (Md. 1952); Stadler v. Cross, 295
N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980) (en banc); Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp., 799
S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1990) (en banc); Bovsun v. Sanperi 461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1984);
Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Shelton v. Russell Pipe &
Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978); Boucher v. Dixie Medical Ctr., 850 P.2d
1179 (Utah 1992); Vaillancourt v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980); Garrett
v. City of New Berlin, 362 N.W.2d 137 (Wis. 1985).
61. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 436 cm. h (1965).
62. Prosser, supra note 18, § 54, at 365.
63. Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Virginia
continue to follow the impact rule. See OB-GYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 386
S.E2d 146 (Ga. 1989); Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456 (Idaho
1996); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991); Anderson v. Scheffler,
752 P.2d 667 (Kan. 1988); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980); Kraszewski v.
Baptist Medical Ctr. of Okla., Inc., 916 P.2d 241 (Okla. 1996); Hammond v. Central
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Zone of danger jurisdictions and bystander proximity jurisdictions
both predicate the right of action on the existence of a "close relation-
ship" between the plaintiff and the injured party. Courts typically in-
terpret this required relation as a relation by blood, adoption, or
marriage.6a The close relationship requirement limits the class of
plaintiffs that may assert the cause of action. This limitation serves an
important purpose; without it, the number of potential plaintiffs could
be enormous, as anyone could claim emotional distress caused by any
event he saw, heard, or even read about.65 For instance, if a distres-
sing event were televised, all the viewers could claim emotional dis-
tress. Because it provides one type of limitation on liability, courts
have interpreted the close relationship prong very narrowly in both
zone of danger and bystander proximity jurisdictions.66
The narrow interpretation of the relationship prong is exemplified
in Kately v. Wilkinson,67 where the court denied recovery to a mother
and daughter who witnessed the death of the daughter's best friend,
who was like a sister and daughter to them.68 Similarly, in Coon v.
Joseph,69 another California court also denied recovery for emotional
distress where a male plaintiff witnessed a bus driver assault his male
"exclusive life partner[ ].1170 The court found that the relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and the injured party did not satisfy the close rela-
tionship requirement.71 In contrast, a child in Hawaii successfully
stated a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
when he witnessed a car hit his stepfather's mother, with whom he
alleged a very close relationship.72
Lane Communications Ctr., 816 P.2d 593 (Or. 1991) (en banc); Hughes v. Moore, 197
S.E.2d 214 (Va. 1973). Alabama and Arkansas have no cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, either for a direct victim or a bystander. See Gideon v.
Norfolk Southern Corp., 633 So. 2d 453 (Ala. 1994) (per curiam); Dalrymple v. Fields,
633 S.W.2d 362 (Ark. 1982). South Dakota requires physical manifestations of dis-
tress and proof of a causal nexus between the distress and the defendant's conduct.
See Nelson v. Web Water Dev. Ass'n., 507 N.W.2d 691 (S.D. 1993).
64. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the prongs of
the zone of danger test, and supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the prongs of the bystander proximity test.
65. See Prosser, supra note 18, § 54, at 366 (expressing concerns about unlimited
liability); see also S. Claire Swift, Note, Bystander Liability After Dunphy v. Gregor:
A Proposal for a New Definition of the Bystander, 15 Rev. Litig. 579, 595-96 (1996)
(discussing the concerns about unlimited liability).
66. See Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 376 (N.J. 1994) ("We have .. .en-
couraged narrow applications of the other prongs [of Dillon] ... ."); id. at 381 (Gari-
baldi, J., dissenting) (noting the previously narrow interpretation of the elements of
the Dillon test).
67. 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (Ct. App. 1983).
68. Id- at 903 ("[W]here, as here, the relationship is not a family relationship but
one akin to a family relationship because of friendship and past associations, the rela-
tionship guideline is not satisfied.").
69. 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Ct. App. 1987).
70. Id. at 874.
71. Id. at 874, 876-78.
72. Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 767 (Haw. 1974).
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Another notable recent exception to the strict interpretations of
"close relation" occurred in Dunphy v. Gregor,73 where the Supreme
Court of New Jersey allowed recovery by a woman who was not mar-
ried to the injured party, but was engaged to and living with him. The
court found the relationship of the engaged cohabitants to be "stable,
enduring, substantial, and mutually supportive... cemented by strong
emotional bonds... [providing] a deep and pervasive emotional se-
curity," and held that the relationship was an "intimate familial rela-
tionship."'74 Although New Jersey's expansion of bystander liability is
notable, it is largely an anomaly.75 Most jurisdictions that allow by-
stander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress interpret
"closely related" as meaning spouse, parent, or child.76 Thus, standing
to recover is strictly delineated to a narrowly defined category for by-
stander distress as well.
C. Summary of Relationship Requirements
In short, the loss of consortium cause of action is available only to a
limited segment of society. The law recognizes the cause of action for
husbands and wives, and occasionally for children and parents. By-
stander distress is similarly limited in states recognizing the tort, as
both the zone of danger test and the bystander proximity test require
that the plaintiff be closely related to the injured party. The close re-
lation requirement is typically interpreted as a biological, adoptive, or
a marital relationship, although there are scattered exceptions. Other
types of relationships exist where injury to one would occasion a loss
of companionship or distress to another, but these individuals do not
have standing to assert a cause of action under the current law. The
next part examines the rationales and policy reasons for limiting the
types of relationships that satisfy the relationship requirements.
II. RATIONALES FOR THE RELATIONSHIP REQUIREMENTS
Courts faced with possible expansion of the relationship require-
ments of these torts consider several factors in deciding whether to
73. 642 A.2d 372 (NJ. 1994).
74. I- at 380.
75. The only other jurisdiction that has permitted an engaged person to recover
for emotional distress is Indiana. See Pieters v. B-Right Trucking, Inc., 669 F. Supp.
1463, 1471 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (holding that Indiana's impact rule would permit a fian-
cde's recovery for emotional distress suffered as a result of witnessing fiancd's death in
a car accident). Several other jurisdictions, however, have held that a relationship by
blood, marriage, or adoption between the plaintiff and the injured party is not neces-
sary to bystander recovery. See; e.g., Leong, 520 P.2d at 766 (permitting child to re-
cover for emotional distress suffered from witnessing a car hit his stepfather's
mother). Although New Jersey and Indiana have permitted unmarried heterosexual
couples to recovery, there is no case law from either state granting or denying recov-
ery to homosexuals. This Note assumes that these jurisdictions would deny recovery
to homosexuals if and when they are faced with the issue.
76. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436 & cmts. f-h (1965).
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allow the plaintiff to assert the cause of action. Typically, the court
will examine whether the asserted relationship is worthy of the state's
recognition and protection. In addition, the court will consider ad-
ministrative reasons, such as the need to limit liability and avoid over-
burdening the courts. Once the court has weighed these factors, it
determines whether the particular asserted relationship in fact satis-
fies the relationship requirements necessary to state the cause of
action.
A. Administrative Concerns: Limiting Liability and Burden
on the Courts
Courts are rightfully concerned with limiting the liability associated
with accidents. Any number of people may witness an accident, and
allowing all witnesses to recover for emotional distress would be im-
practicable and unfair.77 Lines must be drawn to limit the number of
people to whom a defendant owes a duty,78 and courts have seen fit to
use this concern as a basis for denying recovery for loss of consortium
or bystander distress to a party who is not related to the injured party
by blood, adoption, or marriage. 79
Courts have also claimed that permitting recovery by those who are
not related by blood, adoption, or marriage would require the court to
make sensitive and difficult inquiries into the status and relevance of
the relationship between the plaintiff and the injured party.80 Because
this would require an evaluation and examination of the private lives
of the plaintiff and her partner, courts have found these inquiries to be
intrusions into the plaintiff's privacy.8' Therefore, courts have de-
77. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
78. Prosser, supra note 18, § 54, at 366; see also Howard J. Kaplan, Bystander Re-
covery: A Policy Oriented Approach, 32 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 877, 899 (1987) (noting
the danger in subjecting a tortfeasor to "potentially crushing liability [and] incurring
liability without end").
79. See, e.g., Sollars v. City of Albuquerque, 794 F. Supp. 360, 363-64 (D.N.M.
1992) (holding that a decedent's daughter, but not his live-in companion who was
mother of the daughter, could state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, adopting rationale of Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988) (en
banc)); Medley v. Strong, 558 N.E.2d 244, 247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (denying woman a
loss of consortium claim stemming from medical malpractice in treating her live-in
lover, because of fear of indiscriminate expansion); Trombetta v. Conkling, 626
N.E.2d 653, 655-56 (N.Y. 1993) (discussing how expansion beyond immediate family
would result in an "unmanageable proliferation of such claims").
80. See Sollars, 794 F. Supp. at 363 (discussing difficulties in making principled
distinctions between relationships); Elden, 758 P.2d at 587 (discussing the resulting
burden on courts).
81. See Elden, 758 P.2d at 587; see also Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals
Bd., 663 P.2d 904, 907 (Cal. 1983) (en banc) (discussing the problems of proof when
examining a claim based on a meretricious relationship).
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clined to undertake these inquiries and determinations, finding them
distasteful and too burdensome.'
B. Protection of a Formalist Family Relationship
In addition to these administrative concerns, some courts decline to
expand the relationship requirements due to an interest in protecting
and encouraging traditional family relationships. These courts have
employed a formalist view of family to determine which relationships
deserve protection.83 The formalist approach is a strict and conven-
tional conception of what relationships constitute a family. Terms like
"spouse," "family," "parent," and "child" refer only to the nuclear
family, absent express exceptions or intent. 4 Under this approach,
factors such as duration of the relationship or level of commitment
carry no weight. The focus is solely the presence or absence of a
blood, adoptive, or marital relationship.85
The formalist approach dictates that only those relationships com-
porting with the traditional definition of family can satisfy the rela-
tionship requirements for loss of consortium and bystander distress.'
Thus, under the formalist view, marriage is the only relationship be-
tween two adults not related by blood that can give way to recovery
for these torts. The formalist approach was followed in Elden v. Shel-
don,87 where the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
could not recover for loss of consortium of his injured fiancee.as The
court summarily stated: "[T]he right to recover for loss of consortium
82. See Sollars, 794 F. Supp. at 363-64; Elden, 758 P.2d at 587; see also Childers v.
Shannon, 444 A.2d 1141, 1142-43 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982) (-It is not the func-
tion of this court to sift through the myriad relationships of a party in a negligence
action to determine which of those near and dear have suffered an injury.... [I]t is an
ill-conceived intrusion into the private lives of individuals.").
83. See, e.g., Sollars v. City of Albuquerque, 794 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D.N.M. 1992)
(denying recovery to woman who lived with and had children with decedent because
they were not married); Medley v. Strong, 558 N.E.2d 244, 247 (111. App. Ct. 1990)
(denying woman cause of action for loss of consortium because she was not married
to the injured party); see also Paula J. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on
Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & Pol'y 107, 122 (1996) (discussing how
the benefits and privileges created to benefit families are available only to families
related by blood, adoption, or marriage).
84. See Mary P. Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family", 26
Gonz. L. Rev. 91, 96-97 (1991); Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits
of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 Harv. L Rev. 1640,
1640-41 (1991) [hereinafter Looking for a Family Resemblance].
85. James D. Esseks, Recent Development, Redefining the Family-Braschi v.
Stahl Associates, 25 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 183, 183 (1990); Looking for a Family
Resemblance, supra note 84, at 1645; see also Jennifer L. Heeb, Comment, Homosex-
ual Marriage the Changing American Family, and the Heterosexual Right to Privacy,
24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 347, 368 (1993) (noting the use of the traditional dictionary
definitions of marriage and family by the courts).
86. See supra part I.C for a summary of the relationship requirements.
87. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
88. Id at 589-90.
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is founded on the relationship of marriage, and absent such a relation-
ship the right does not exist."89 The court similarly denied the plain-
tiff's claim for bystander distress based upon the absence of a marital
relationship at the time of injury, relying on the same rationale."
The formalist approach focuses heavily on marriage to satisfy the
relationship requirements, as evidenced by the court's opinion in
Elden. This corresponds with the importance the United States places
upon the institution of marriage, as emphasized by the Supreme Court
in several decisions. In Maynard v. Hill,9 the Court stated: "[Mar-
riage] is the foundation of the family and of society, without which
there would be neither civilization nor progress." g The Court has
echoed this sentiment in more recent cases, including Griswold v.
Connecticut,93 Loving v. Virginia,94 and Zablocki v. Redhail.95
Marriage is traditionally the foundation of the family,96 and as such
it serves several important functions: procreation, promotion of indi-
vidual happiness and stability, and promotion of societal stability.97
Procreation, including bearing and raising of children, is necessary to
perpetuate the human race, and it is argued that this is best accom-
plished within a marital relationship.98 Therefore, the marital rela-
tionship deserves vigorous and vigilant protection. 99 Marriage also
89. Il at 589.
90. See id. at 587 ("Formally married couples are granted significant rights and
bear important responsibilities toward one another which are not shared by [unmar-
ried people].").
91. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
92. Id at 211.
93. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ("[Marriage] is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not com-
mercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any in-
volved in our prior decisions.").
94. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (stating marriage is a "'basic civil right[ ] of man,' funda-
mental to our very existence and survival" (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942))).
95. 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (noting that marriage is "the foundation of the family
in our society").
96. See Extending Consortium Rights, supra note 20, at 923.
97. See Martin, supra note 17, at 1475-76; Robert M. Moroney, The Family and the
State: Considerations for Social Policy 15 (1976).
98. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Shirley S.
Simpson, Note, The Parental Claim for Loss of Society and Companionship Resulting
from the Negligent Injury of a Child: A Proposal for Arizona, 1980 Ariz. St. L.J. 909,
923-24.
99. See Alissa Friedman, The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Mar-
riage: Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 Berkeley Wo-
men's Li. 134, 161 (1987-88) (articulating the argument regarding the state's interest
in procreation); see, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal.
1980) ("The legal protection.., afforded to marriage... has historically... been
rationalized as being for the purpose of encouraging the propagation of the race."),
affd, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); Singer, 522 P.2d at
1195 ("[M]arriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of societal
values associated with the propagation of the human race.").
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provides emotional and psychological support,'00 which bears an im-
portant connection to individual happiness and stability. This, in turn,
encourages societal stability, 10 1 which involves preservation of family
unity and traditional values,"~ including promotion of heterosexual
marriages. °3
The partnership formed by a marriage encourages a cooperative ef-
fort and increases the stability of individuals, which results in the in-
creasing stability of society.'0 4 Social policy also favors and
encourages marriage because the institution is "rooted in the necessity
of providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental rela-
tional rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society." 5
In sum, "marriage promotes community and individual values, and is
viewed as essential to the maintenance of liberty and government."' 6
Another justification offered to support the state's interest in tradi-
tional marriage is encouragement of heterosexuality and morality. 1 1
Proponents of this justification espouse the belief that a "homosexual
lifestyle" should not be supported and condoned by the states 3 8 Fur-
thermore, it has been suggested that if the states were to condone ho-
mosexuality, that individuals would choose same-sex relationships
rather than a heterosexual marriage, 0 9 which would undermine the
other state interests in traditional marriage, such as procreation, and
promotion and protection of individual and community values.
C. Protection of a Functionalist Family Relationship
In contrast to the formalist approach, which emphasizes the legal
status of marriage, the functionalist approach to family focuses on the
quality of the asserted relationship. This approach acknowledges the
shared relationship that is the emotional and functional counterpart to
a nuclear family relationship, regardless of the presence or absence of
100. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv. L Rev.
1156, 1285-86 (1980).
101. See Martin, supra note 17, at 1476.
102. Developments, supra note 8, at 1607, 1609.
103. See Friedman, supra note 99, at 165 (articulating the argument that denying
legal recognition to gays and lesbians serves a state's interest in discouraging homo-
sexuality and encouraging marriages).
104. See Martin, supra note 17, at 1476 (citing Grace G. Blumberg, Cohabitation
Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L Rev. 1125, 1137 (1981)).
105. Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 1983); see also Treuthart, supra note
84, at 92-93 (discussing the general social policy favoring marriage).
106. Heeb, supra note 85, at 351 (citations omitted).
107. See Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumber-
ing Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests,
64 Fordham L. Rev. 921, 976-77 (1995).
108. See Arthur A. Murphy & John P. Ellington, Homosexuality and the Law: Tol-
erance and Containment II, 97 Dick. L. Rev. 693, 697-99 (1993).
109. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique
of the Argument from Immutability, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 518 (1994); Murphy & El-
lington, supra note 108, at 694; Strasser, supra note 107, at 976.
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biological, adoptive, or marital ties." Courts recognizing functional
families place importance on the quality of the relationships rather
than the terminology attached to it."
The functionalist view of family "inquires whether a relationship
shares the essential characteristics of a traditionally accepted relation-
ship and fulfills the same human needs."1 2 Thus, the functionalist ap-
proach considers specific characteristics of a particular relationship to
determine if the relationship constitutes a family." 3 Proponents of
this approach posit that a relationship exhibiting characteristics of a
traditional family relationship merits the same legal recognition as the
traditional relationship. 114
In Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.," 5 the New York Court of Ap-
peals used the functionalist approach to the definition of family, and
held that the term "family" in a non-eviction provision of rent-control
laws included a lifetime gay partner." 6 The court stated:
The intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on
fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find
its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of eviction,
a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family in-
110. See, e.g., Mobaldi v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal., 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Ct.
App. 1976) (permitting a foster mother to recover for emotional distress upon wit-
nessing hospital personnel give her foster child a fatal dose of glucose solution, and
holding the child in her arms as he suffered convulsions and entered a coma), over-
ruled by Baxter v. Superior Court, 563 P.2d 871 (Cal. 1977) (en banc); Leong v.
Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974) (permitting a child to state cause of action for
bystander distress due to his witnessing a car hit his stepfather's mother); Dunphy v.
Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994) (allowing one party in an unmarried cohabitating
heterosexual relationship to recover for bystander distress after witnessing injury to
the other); Garcia v. San Antonio Hous. Auth., 859 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that an uncle, who suffered emotional distress after rescuing his nephew with
whom he lived from a fire, could state a cause of action for bystander distress).
111. See Ettelbrick, supra note 83, at 130-31. A prominent use of the functional
approach to defining family was that of the California courts in the years between
Butcher v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1983), overruled by Elden v.
Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988) (en banc), and the decision overruling Butcher.
Thus, although many of the California decisions employing a functional definition of
family have been overruled, they provide a useful example of the functional
approach.
112. Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 84, at 1646.
113. Id Considering specific characteristics of a particular relationship gives judges
much discretion in determining what factors are important and the respective weight
of each factor. Id at 1653. The author suggests that legislatures should eliminate thisjudicial discretion by establishing recognition mechanisms to formalize relationships,
like domestic partnership statutes, that would be unassailable by judges. Id. at 1657-
59. These statutes, however, are extremely rare, and often do not live up to their
promise of equality between traditional and non-traditional families. See Treuthart,
supra note 84, at 101 & n.32 (discussing the limited number of jurisdictions with do-
mestic partnership measures); Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 84, at
1658.
114. See Martin, supra note 17, at 1477-78.
115. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
116. Id at 53-54.
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cludes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term
and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and
interdependence.
17
A key factor in the court's decision was the extent to which Braschi
and his partner's relationship looked like a marriage. The court
looked at the exclusivity and duration of the relationship, the level of
emotional and financial commitment, whether they had held each
other out as a "spouse," and their reliance upon each other in family
life.118 This exemplifies the functionalist approach to family, because
the relationship of Braschi and his partner did not correspond with
formalist terminology. Thus, the court examined the relationship to
determine if it had the essential characteristics of marriage and ful-
filled the same personal needs, and concluded that the relationship did
constitute a family."19
The criteria used in Braschi to determine the possible existence of a
functional family bear a strong resemblance to those advanced in
Butcher v. Superior Court'2 0 to determine a "stable and significant"
relationship. In Butcher, the court held that an unmarried cohabitant
who could demonstrate a stable and significant relationship could
state a cause of action for loss of consortium.121 Although this deci-
sion was overruled five years later by Elden v. Sheldon," - it still pro-
vides a useful example of a functionalist approach to family. In
Butcher, the court held that the existence of a mutual contract, the
level of economic cooperation and interdependence, presence and ex-
clusivity of sexual relations, and the raising of children could show the
stability and significance of the relationship. 1 3 The court explained
the import and application of these guidelines:
While the particular items of evidence will vary from case to case,
and some of these suggested criteria may be absent, and other dif-
ferent ones present, the plaintiff will bear the burden of demonstrat-
ing both that the relationship is stable and that it has those
characteristics of significance which one may expect to find in what
is essentially a de facto marriage.1 4
117. Id.
118. Id. at 55.
119. ld. at 53-55; see also Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Dist
Ct. App. 1967) (holding that a group of nuns constituted a family for zoning pur-
poses); Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954)
(holding that a group of nurses constituted a family for zoning purposes); Borough of
Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888 (NJ. 1990) (per curiam) (holding that ten unre-
lated male college students constituted a family for zoning purposes); Missionaries of
Our Lady of La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 66 N.W.2d 627 (,Vis. 1954) (hold-
ing that a group of priests constituted a family for zoning purposes).
120. 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1983), overruled by Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d
582 (Cal 1988) (en banc).
121. Ia at 512.
122. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
123. Butcher, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
124. Id.
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In other words, the court suggested an examination of the relation-
ship to determine whether it shares the essential qualities and pro-
vides the emotional support of a traditional family relationship-here,
a marriage. This inquiry and examination of a relationship are the
crux of the functionalist approach."z To the extent that these non-
traditional relationships have the same characteristics and serve the
same valid and valuable purposes as a traditional family, they should
be afforded the same legal protections and benefits. 26 Although
many courts have employed a functionalist approach in defining fam-
ily that has included homosexual couples,'27 no court has allowed a
homosexual couple to recover for loss of consortium or bystander
distress.a 8
III. EQUAL PRoTEcTION AND ROMER v. EVANS
This part argues that denying homosexuals the rights of action for
loss of consortium and bystander distress violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 129 because denying these
rights of action is not rationally related to state purposes, or, in some
instances, the state purpose is, in fact, illegitimate. First, this part dis-
cusses Romer v. Evans 3 ' and determines that the Romer rational rela-
tionship test is applicable to the judicially created relationship
requirements. This part then examines the proffered state purposes to
determine if they satisfy the rational relationship test. This part con-
cludes that denying gays and lesbians the rights of action does not pass
the Romer rational relationship test.
A. Romer v. Evans and the Rational Relationship Test
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment estab-
lishes the principle that no person shall be denied equal protection of
the laws. 131 Last year, in Romer v. Evans, 32 the Supreme Court used
the Equal Protection Clause to strike down Colorado's anti-homosex-
125. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that a lesbian partner had a right to be appointed guardian of her
disabled partner because the relationship constituted a "family of affinity"); Braschi v.
Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that the term "family" in a non-
eviction provision of rent-control laws included a lifetime gay partner); State v. Had-
inger, 573 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (permitting the state to charge a lesbian
partner under the state's domestic violence statute).
128. For a discussion of ways the law has changed to give gay and lesbian couples
various protections and legal rights, see Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of
Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of "Fam-
ily", 29 J. Fain. L. 497 (1991).
129. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
130. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
131. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
132. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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ual Amendment 2, a decision heralded as "the seminal decision in the
jurisprudence of equal protection for gay people." 33
Amendment 2 was a voter referendum adopted in response to ordi-
nances passed by Colorado municipalities that prohibited discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation in education, employment, health and
welfare, housing, and public accommodations.'31 Amendment 2 was
designed to repeal these ordinances to the extent that they prohibited
discrimination based on sexual orientation.13 5 The state argued that
the amendment merely denied gays, lesbians, and bisexuals special
rights and, in fact, put them in the same position as everyone else.'
36
The plaintiffs alleged that the amendment would subject them to "im-
mediate and substantial risk of discrimination on the basis of their
sexual orientation."' 137 The Supreme Court side stepped the issue of
whether gays and lesbians are a suspect class, which would merit a
higher level of scrutiny, by holding that the law failed even to pass the
lowest level of scrutiny, the rational relationship test.'3
1. The Romer Rationality Review
It is uncommon for a state law to fail rational relationship scrutiny,
as occurred in Romer.'39 But the Romer rational relationship test
seems more stringent than the usual rational relationship test. One
commentator has called Romer's application of the standard a "mus-
cular rational basis review."'a'1 So, although the Court purported to
apply a mere rational relationship standard, requiring that "the classi-
133. Tobias B. Wolff, Case Note, Principled Silence, 106 Yale LJ. 247, 248 (1996);
see also Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle Transformation
in Judicial Argument over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L Rev. 893, 951 ("Romer is the
culmination of ten years of progress in gay rights litigation and twenty five years of
gay rights advocacy, as well as a milepost on a longer journey."); id. at 963 ("Romer
clearly portends a major change in our law of sexual orientation.").
134. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
135. 1&
136. IL at 1624.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1627; see Anthony M. Dillof, Romer v. Evans and the Constitutionality of
Higher Lawmaking, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 361, 374 (1996) (noting that the Romer majority
did not need to reach the question whether Amendment 2 deserved a higher level of
scrutiny, because the Court held that the amendment failed the rational relation test).
For an argument that Romer is a stepping stone to a future determination that sexual
orientation classifications require a heightened level of scrutiny, see Wolff, supra note
133, at 251-52.
139. Treuthart, supra note 84, at 109; Harris K. Miller II, Note, An Argument for
the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on
Homosexuality, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 797, 808 (1984) (discussing how most laws pass the
rationality review and referring to the rational relationship test as merely a "rubber-
stamp review"). The last case previous to Romer to fail the rational relationship test
was City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Dilof, supra
note 138, at 384.
140. Jacobs, supra note 133, at 963; see also Dillof, supra note 138, at 379 (referring
to Romer's "nudging of the rational relation test toward intermediate scrutiny").
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fication bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate
legislative end,"'' the Court admitted that Amendment 2 "confounds
this normal process of judicial review."' 42 The peculiarity of the
Romer rational relationship test is found in the Court's discussion of
the overbreadth of Amendment 2. The Court stated that the amend-
ment was so broad that it could not possibly be rationally related to
the purposes advanced by Colorado.'43 Breadth of a statute, however,
is usually a benefit when applying a rational relationship test: the
broader the statute, the more likely that it will have some effect that
can be characterized as a legitimate state purpose.1'" The Court de-
clined to recognize Colorado's proffered purposes as legitimate, how-
ever, and focused on animus as the underlying motivation. The Court
states that "desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot con-
stitute a legitimate governmental interest."' 45 In finding the state pur-
poses illegitimate, it seems that the Court was not applying the regular
rational relationship standard.' 46 The Romer rational relationship test
has more bite than the usual rational relationship test, 4 7 although,
strangely, the Court did not actually engage in the rational relation-
ship analysis. 48 The Court did not discuss the legitimacy of the state
141. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
142. Id. at 1627-28.
143. Id at 1629.
144. Dillof, supra note 138, at 378-79; see, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (applying rational relationship scrutiny and holding that a
Texas school financing system based on property tax was constitutional), reh'g denied,
411 U.S. 959 (1973).
145. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)).
146. See Gayle L. Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by
Any Other Name, 62 Ind. L.i. 779, 793-94 (1987) (discussing the Court's opinion in
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), as an example of
this stricter form of rational relationship review). The scrutiny level applied in
Cleburne permits the Court to "look[ ] more closely at the relationship of the classifi-
cation to achieving the state's goal [and to] not accept every goal proffered by the
state." Id at 801.
147. Dillof, supra note 138, at 379; Jacobs, supra note 133, at 963-64; Cass R.
Sunstein, Foreword- Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 77 ("It should
be clear by this point that the 1995 Term has modified traditional equal protection
doctrine. Romer suggests that rationality review will not always result in validation;
its form of rationality review is far more like the intermediate variety."). The view
that Romer's rationality review is in fact a heightened standard of scrutiny is not uni-
versal, although it is widely held. Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Princi-
ple, 13 Const. Commentary 257, 263 (1996). For an argument that the Supreme Court
invalidated Colorado's Amendment 2 without using a heightened scrutiny level, see
generally id. This Note assumes that the rationality standard used in Romer is not
mere rational relationship scrutiny nor intermediate scrutiny, but rather, what has
been called "rational relationship with teeth," similar to the level of scrutiny applied
in Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432.
148. Dillof, supra note 138, at 378 ("The Court simply makes no efforts to assess
the effects, or lack thereof, that Amendment 2 will have relative to its alleged
justifications.").
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purposes because it found that this amendment could not possibly re-
late to any legitimate state purpose due to its overbreadth. 49
Because the Court failed to actually apply the rational relationship
test, the opinion provides little guidance for its application. 50 Thus,
commentators have tried to offer potential explanations of the Romer
case. 15' The opinion, however, does dictate the use of at least a ra-
tional relationship test where "[h]omosexuals are forbidden the safe-
guards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint."152
Amendment 2 "identifies persons by a single trait and ... denies them
protection across the board."' 53
2. The Equal Protection Purpose Requirement
Jurisdictions that do not permit a claim for a bystander's mental
distress' 14 or decline to recognize a cause of action for loss of consor-
tium155 do not encounter an equal protection problem, as they are
treating all people alike in that no one-heterosexual or homosexual,
married or unmarried-has a right of action for these torts. Jurisdic-
tions that do recognize the torts, 56 however, encounter an equal pro-
tection problem under Romer.
The judicially created classifications embodied in the relationship
requirements for loss of consortium and bystander distress actions dis-
criminate in the same way as Amendment 2: they classify people ac-
cording to their sexual orientation and deny them the rights of action
for these torts. The relationship requirements, however, differ from
Amendment 2 in a very significant way: they are not facially discrimi-
natory, although they do produce disparate results. If a law is not
facially discriminatory, 157 a party claiming an equal protection viola-
tion must show that the underlying purpose of the law is, in fact, to
discriminate.
149. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996).
150. See Dillof, supra note 138, at 373 (discussing the brevity of the Court's opinion
and the absence of extensive analysis and argument); see also Richard C. Reuben,
Gay Rights Watershed? Scholars Debate Whether Past and Future Cases Will Be Af-
fected by Supreme Court's Romer Decision, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 30 (discussing the
unclear impact of the opinion).
151. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95
Mich. L. Rev. 203 (1996) (arguing that the Court's opinion in Romer is illuminated
and clarified when considered in conjunction with the Attainder Clause of the Consti-
tution); Steven A. Delchin, Comment, Scalia 18:22: Thou Shall Not Lie with the Aca-
demic and Law School Elite: It Is an Abomination-Romer v. Evans and America's
Culture War, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 207, 227-42 (1996) (offering several potential
explanations of the decision).
152. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
153. Id. at 1628.
154. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 23, 59-60.
157. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
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There are two ways to show a discriminatory purpose behind a law
that is not facially discriminatory. First, the law may classify people
through its application. 158 For example, the government may adminis-
ter a law with different degrees of severity to different persons, based
on a suspect trait.159 Second, if the law results in a disparate impact
on a class of people and a purpose to effect this discrimination may be
discerned, the purpose requirement is fulfilled. 160
Denying homosexuals the rights of action for loss of consortium and
bystander distress falls into the second category, governed by Wash-
ington v. Davis16' and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp.'61 In Washington, the Supreme Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause is violated only where the discrimination is
the product of a discriminatory purpose. 63 In addition, a showing of
disparate impact, while a factor in ascertaining intent, is never by itself
sufficient to prove discriminatory intent.' 64 The Court clarified the
purpose requirement in Arlington Heights, holding that the motive to
discriminate need not be the sole motive of the classification to invoke
equal protection analysis.' 65 Rather, it is enough if the discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor in the creation of the classification.' 66
There are basically two ways to determine the motive of state ac-
tors: "First, evidence of the institution's actions and the circumstances
that may have affected those actions may establish an institution's mo-
tivation. . . . Second, evidence of the intent of individual deci-
sionmakers may prove the motives of a decisionmaking body.' 1 67
Acquisition and examination of such evidence, however, are substan-
tial difficulties." s It is particularly difficult to ascertain a discrimina-
tory purpose when dealing with judicially crafted standards, such as
the relationship requirements. To determine the motivation of a deci-
sionmaking body, courts may look to testimony of a decisionmaker, 169
"written embodiments" of the law or policy,170 or legislative history.
Such evidence does not exist, however, when examining judicially
158. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 362-63 (1886).
159. Id
160. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
245-46 (1976).
161. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
162. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
163. 426 U.S. at 239-41.
164. Id at 242-43; see Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272
(1979).
165. 429 U.S. at 265-66.
166. Id.
167. Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A
Subpoena for Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 879, 966-67 (1985).
168. See id at 884-85.
169. Id. at 967.
170. Cook v. Babbitt, 819 F. Supp. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 1993).
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crafted common law, such as the development and enforcement of the
relationship requirements.
A discriminatory purpose is evident in jurisdictions employing a
functionalist approach to permit unmarried heterosexuals to recover,
assuming these states would deny recovery by similarly situated
homosexuals. These jurisdictions would be blatantly discriminating
on the basis of sexual orientation, evidencing the discriminatory pur-
pose required to show an equal protection violation.
In contrast, the existence of an illegitimate purpose as a motivating
factor to deny expansion of the relationship requirements in those ju-
risdictions adhering to the formalist approach is not as evident or as-
certainable. Because these states do not allow unmarried
heterosexuals to recover either, it seems as if they are not making a
classification based on sexual orientation, but rather a classification
based on marital status.171 The disparate impact of these classifica-
tions on homosexuals, however, is evident."7 Two homosexuals in a
lifetime relationship would never be able to recover for loss of consor-
tium or bystander distress, while a heterosexual couple would be able
to recover as soon as they possessed a marriage certificate.
No state currently allows homosexuals to obtain a marriage li-
cese. 173 Marriage licenses are available only to heterosexuals who
are marrying a person of the opposite sex. Prohibiting same sex mar-
riage is unconstitutional because of the requirement of heterosexual-
ity, and as such is discrimination against homosexuals.1 74 These states
deny homosexuals the ability to obtain a marriage license, predicate
recovery for loss of consortium and bystander distress on the exist-
ence of a valid marriage, and have knowledge of the disparate impact
171. Marital status classifications usually dictate the use of the mere rationality
standard. See, eg., Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
marital status classification for Supplemental Security Income purposes was to be ex-
amined under the rationality standard), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1198 (1994). For an
argument that laws distinguishing on the basis of marital status do not pass the mere
rationality test, see Jennifer Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of Unmarried Peo-
ple in American Law, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 207, 220-34 (1988). Jaff also argues that the
law's emphasis on marriage and traditional family, and conversely the law's treatment
of unmarried individuals, favors racism, sexual oppression, and male-dominance, and
that the legal and social preference for marriage negatively affects and burdens gen-
der, racial, and sexual minorities. Id at 236-38.
172. Mere disparate impact, however, is not enough to infer a discriminatory pur-
pose. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
173. A circuit court judge in Hawaii, however, has ordered the state government to
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996
WL 694942 at *21 (Haw. 1st Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996); Victoria Slind-Flor, Same-Sex Case
Poses Many Questions, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 16, 1996, at A8. A stay has been issued pend-
ing appeal to the Hawaii Supreme Court. Carey Goldberg, Hawaii Judge Ends Gay-
Marriage Ban, N.Y. Tmes, Dec. 4, 1996, at Al.
174. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993); see also Andrew Koppelman,
Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 197 (1994) (arguing that discrimination against homosexuals is sex discrimina-
tion which the state may not practice absent a sufficient state purpose).
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the relationship requirements have on homosexuals. Therefore, a dis-
criminatory purpose in the decision of a state actor (here, the judici-
ary) to deny recovery for bystander distress and loss of consortium to
homosexuals may be inferred from the discriminatory purpose behind
denying homosexuals marriage licenses plus the knowledge of the dis-
parate impact on homosexuals regarding recovery for these torts, be-
cause the ability to recover is predicated on the existence of a valid
marriage. 175
Therefore, Romer level scrutiny is applicable to both types of juris-
dictions: those permitting unmarried heterosexuals to recover for loss
of consortium and bystander distress and those who predicate recov-
ery on the existence of a valid marriage. Assuming the states in the
former category would deny recovery to unmarried homosexual
couples, permitting similarly situated heterosexuals the rights of ac-
tion is clearly a classification based on sexual orientation, with the
requisite purpose. The states in the latter category employ a back
door method of discriminating of sexual orientation by focusing on
marital status. 176 Unmarried heterosexuals have a means of recovery
that homosexuals do not: marriage. Because marriage is not available
to homosexuals, the purported marital status classification is particu-
larly burdensome to homosexuals, 177 and to that extent it is actually a
classification based on sexual orientation, 178 and is therefore subject
to Romer rational relationship scrutiny.
B. Applying the Rational Relationship Test to the Purposes
Advanced in Denying Expansion of the
Relationship Requirements
Due to this discrimination based on sexual orientation, the Romer
rational relationship test dictates first that the reasons given for limit-
ing the relationship requirements 179 be legitimate state purposes, and
second, that denying an expansion of the relationship requirement is
rationally related to those purposes. This section applies the Romer
175. But see Model Penal Code § 2.02 & cmt. 2 (1985) (drawing a narrow distinc-
tion between purpose and knowledge in the criminal mens rea provisions).
176. See Stacey L. Boyle, Note, Martial Status Classifications: Protecting Homosex-
ual and Heterosexual Cohabitors, 14 Hastings Const. L.Q. 111, 111-12, 134 (1987)("Many laws discriminating against homosexuals classify by marital status rather than
sexual orientation."); Developments, supra note 8, at 1604 ("The law's seemingly
evenhanded treatment of unmarried couples in fact penalizes same-sex couples more
severely, because gay men and lesbians do not have the option of marriage."); Heeb,
supra note 85, at 368 (stating that reliance on the traditional definition of marriage
results in disparate treatment of gays and lesbians); see also Evangelista Assocs. v.
Bland, 458 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (Civ. Ct. 1983) (holding that cohabitation by two men
was not entitled to marital status protection, but could be entitled to protection based
on sexual orientation).
177. Jaff, supra note 171, at 237.
178. See supra note 176.
179. See supra part II.A.
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rational relationship test to determine if the reasons given for denying
homosexuals the causes of action are legitimate, and if so, whether the
denial is rationally related to those ends.
1. Administrative Concerns: Limiting Liability and
Burden on Courts
Limiting liability is a legitimate state purpose, especially in light of
the large number of plaintiffs that could assert a cause of action for an
occurrence such as a mass accident. The New York Court of Appeals
has stated, "[e]very injury has ramifying consequences, like the rip-
plings of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit
the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.""s With-
out any limitation, everyday human activity would be burdened and
overwrought with risk if every defendant who has injured someone
were forced to compensate every other person disturbed by the inci-
dent.' Liability must be limited to keep the defendant's accountabil-
ity in proportion to his negligence. ] 2
Having established that limiting liability is a valid state purpose, the
Romer rational relationship test dictates that denying gays and lesbi-
ans the rights of action for loss of consortium and bystander distress
must be rationally related to limiting liability, and therefore must fit
that purpose. This test is not met, however, because permitting homo-
sexuals the rights of action would not result in limitless liability.
Other effective mechanisms exist to sufficiently limit the potential
class of plaintiffs.
For example, the plaintiff would still need to prove that the defend-
ant did, in fact, owe her the initial duty of due care dictated by tradi-
tional tort doctrine.'1s Additionally, a sufficiently close relationship
must exist, and the plaintiff would also need to prove that the relation-
ship is the functional equivalent of a family.11 Extending the causes
of action to gays and lesbians would simply prevent their automatic
preclusion, because "[a] partner who could not demonstrate a reason-
ably lengthy involvement or financial interdependence with the in-
jured party would [still] be ineligible for damages." 1 s
Furthermore, the plaintiff would need to prove foreseeability, which
is also a limiting factor.' 6 Stating a cause of action for bystander dis-
180. Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969).
181. Prosser, supra note 18, § 54, at 366.
182. Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814, 826-27 (Cal. 1989) (en banc).
183. Developments, supra note 8, at 1621-22.
184. Sampedro, supra note 42, at 1115-16 (1996); Developments, supra note 8, at
1621-22.
185. Developments, supra note 8, at 1622.
186. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 377 (NJ. 1994). Perhaps, however, foresee-
ability is not a stringent limitation. "One can reasonably foresee that people who
enjoy an intimate familial relationship with one another will be especially vulnerable
to emotional injury resulting from a tragedy befalling one of them." I&
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tress would also require the plaintiff to show that she meets the other
prongs of the Dillon/Thing test, which include presence and awareness
of the injury producing event, and resulting serious emotional dis-
tress. 187 Thus, it seems unlikely that allowing lifetime homosexual
partners to have the rights of action for bystander distress and loss of
consortium would result in limitless liability. If anything, denying gays
and lesbians the opportunity to prove functional family relationships
because of fears of increased litigation is quite likely to preclude re-
covery by individuals who may in fact have suffered a real and legiti-
mate loss. 188
The second administrative state purpose advanced for the strict lim-
itations on the relationship requirements is to prevent a burden on the
courts.'8 9 The concerns courts cite, however, are not related to over-
crowding of the docket or untimely disposition of cases. Rather,
courts note that the fact finders would find it difficult to make the
necessary inquiries.190 Thus, it seems that the state purpose is to allow
the courts to decline to hear and decide difficult cases that may in-
volve sensitive and difficult inquiries. Essentially, this provides courts
with the opportunity to avoid difficult cases because they require too
much work. This is not a legitimate state purpose. Indeed, perhaps
there is more reason for courts to hear and decide the difficult cases.
Furthermore, courts and juries engage in these factual inquiries all the
time, so their difficulty has not been a prohibitive factor in the past.1 9 '
Thus, preventing an excessive burden on the courts is not a legitimate
state purpose, at least regarding the type of burden about which the
courts have expressed concern.
187. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
188. See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 379-80; see also Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 593
(Cal. 1988) (en banc) (Broussard, J., dissenting) ("[T]he rights of a proposed new
class of tort plaintiffs should be forthrightly judged on their own merits, rather than by
indulging in gloomy speculation on where it will all end." (quoting Borer v. American
Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 870 (Cal. 1977) (Mosk, J., dissenting))); Sampedro, supra
note 42, at 1115 (noting that "if unlimited liability is a sufficient justification for a
court to prohibit unmarried cohabitants from recovery, valid emotional injuries would
remain uncompensated").
189. See discussion supra part II.A.
190. See Elden, 758 P.2d at 587; see also Sollars v. City of Albuquerque, 794 F.
Supp. 360, 363 (D.N.M. 1992) (discussing the difficulties in making distinctions be-
tween relationships); Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 381 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (voicing con-
cerns about intolerable burdens on courts resulting from expansion of relationship
requirements).
191. Elden, 758 P.2d at 592 (Broussard, J., dissenting) ("In the past, this court-
including the author of the majority opinion-has soundly rejected the argument that
compensation should be denied to all plaintiffs because of the difficulty of determin-
ing which plaintiffs are deserving and how much they deserve."); see also Coon v.
Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 881 (Ct. App. 1987) (White, J., dissenting) ("Often the
closeness of a relationship is analyzed in order to determine whether a plaintiff may
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress when plaintiff witnesses a partic-
ular person injured.").
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Assuming, arguendo, this purpose is legitimate, denying the rights
of action for loss of consortium and bystander distress to homosexual
partners is not rationally related to prevention of an unreasonable
burden on the courts. Courts make sensitive factual determinations
all the time, as do juries.192 For example, in a loss of consortium case
involving a married couple, the court or jury must evaluate the rela-
tionship and assign a value to it. 93 Determining whether an unmar-
ried plaintiff's relationship satisfies the relationship requirement
requires the same type of inquiry. If a jury can assign a value to a
relationship, jurors can likewise determine whether the relationship
requirement is fulfilled. 19' We continually ask that courts and juries
draw lines and interpret standards in applying tort law.195 If they did
not perform these interpretations, common law tort doctrine would
develop no further.196
With regard to the related claim that the court will be forced to
delve into the personal lives of the plaintiff and his partner, it is an
invited inquiry, because the plaintiff commenced the action. 1' 7 "In
any case, denying legal standing to an injured plaintiff is a strange way
to protect him or her from intrusive litigation."198 Additionally, it is
unfair to deny a plaintiff who has suffered a real and legitimate loss
the opportunity to prove that loss and receive compensation, simply
192. Elden, 758 P.2d at 592.
193. See Howard H. Kestin, The Bystander's Cause of Action for Emotional Injury:
Reflections on the Relational Eligibility Standard, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 512, 539
(1996) (noting that inquiries into the "nature, incidents, and qualities of a personal
relationship... are normally undertaken in other contexts, including evaluation of
typical loss of consortium claims and in determining some issues in divorce actions").
194. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 378 (NJ. 1994) ("[A]ssessment of the quality
of interpersonal relationships is not beyond a jury's ken and ... courts are capable of
dealing with the realities... of relationships to assure that resulting emotional injury
is genuine and deserving of compensation."); see Kestin, supra note 193, at 538. Fur-
thermore, courts employing a functionalist approach to family relationships do engage
in precisely this type of analysis and examination of relationships. Se4 e.g., Braschi v.
Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (discussing quality and character-
istics of homosexual relationship in determining that the relationship constituted a
family within the meaning of a non-eviction provision).
195. Developments, supra note 8, at 1621; see Cornelius J. Peck, Comments on Judi-
cial Creativity, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 13-24 (1983) (discussing examples of "judicial crea-
tivity" in developing and changing tort law); see e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.) (providing an example of judicial line-drawing regarding fore-
seeability of plaintiff), reh'g denied, 164 N.E. 564 (N.Y. 1928).
196. See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 869 (Cal. 1977) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) ("When that crowd is marching in the wrong direction, we have not here-
tofore hesitated to break ranks and strike out on our own. I need not list the many
instances in which this court has initiated new trends in the law of personal torts by
extending the protection of the courts to previously neglected classes of accident
victims.").
197. See Swift, supra note 65, at 600 ("[W]hen bystanders decide to sue for dam-
ages, they volunteer to allow the court to examine their relationships and their do-
mestic lives.").
198. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P2d 582, 593 (Cal. 1988) (en banc) (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
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because of a fear of burdening the courts with difficult tasks and
questions.1 99
2. Protecting the Formalist Relationship of Marriage
In Bowers v. Hardwick, °° the Supreme Court held that the promo-
tion of traditional family values was a legitimate state interest, and
upheld Georgia's anti-sodomy law."0' Therefore, at first blush, it may
seem that Bowers dictates that protection of the formalist relationship
is a legitimate state purpose. This is not the case, however. Although
the Court's opinion in Romer did not expressly deal with Bowers,
Romer clearly bears upon the value of Bowers as precedent. 2" It is
important to consider, however, that Bowers concerned the Due Pro-
cess Clause, and Romer concerned the Equal Protection Clause.203
Because different constitutional provisions were at issue in these
cases, even if Romer did not implicitly overrule or weaken Bowers,
promotion of traditional family values under due process analysis is
not necessarily controlling in an equal protection analysis."°
Indeed, protection of marriage may not be a legitimate state pur-
pose under equal protection analysis, because the goals purportedly
encouraged and embodied by marriage either are not valid areas for
state concern, or are not fostered by marriage alone. A reason typi-
cally given for the importance of marriage and the preferential treat-
ment afforded the institution is that marriage serves a procreative
purpose.0 5 Procreation, however, may not be a justifiable state goal.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade °6 and Eisenstadt v.
Baird20 7 regarding abortion and contraception indicate that procrea-
199. See Borer, 563 P.2d at 867, 870 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
200. 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
201. Id.; see also Sunstein, supra note 147, at 64-65 ("Hardwick seemed to say that
it is legitimate for the state to express disapproval of homosexual conduct .. ").
202. See Sunstein, supra note 147, at 65-69. Sunstein surmises that the Court did
not deal with Bowers expressly because any in depth analysis on that point would not
have commanded a majority opinion. Id. at 71. Ronald Dworkin has stated that the
Romer decision has weakened Bowers, and has "begun the process of isolating and
finally overruling it altogether, an event that would have enormous impact... on
constitutional theory generally." Ronald Dworkin, Sex, Death, and the Courts, N.Y.
Rev. Books, Aug. 8, 1996, at 44, 49-50. Dworkin also speculates that if Bowers were
challenged today, it would garner only three votes (Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas),
in light of Justice Powell's statement that his vote in Bowers was the worst mistake of
his career and Justice O'Connor's joining the majority in Romer. Id.
203. See Sunstein, supra note 147, at 67-68; see also Janet E. Halley, The Politics of
the Closet. Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36
UCLA L. Rev. 915, 975 (1989) (theorizing that Bowers may be reversible on equal
protection grounds).
204. Sunstein, supra note 147, at 67-68.
205. See discussion supra part II.B.
206. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
207. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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tion and population may not be a legitimate area for state concern.2"
Furthermore, the country and the world are not in danger of becom-
ing underpopulated; but, in fact, overpopulation is a valid concern.20 9
Procreation as a policy objective underlying the protection of mar-
riage also fails to recognize that not all heterosexual marriages serve a
procreative function,210 and homosexual couples can and do raise fam-
ilies, now in ever-increasing numbers.211
The additional reasons given for the preferential treatment afforded
marriage are closely related: preservation of family unity and tradi-
tional values, and promotion of societal stability and productivity.2 12
Courts, particularly those employing the functionalist approach to
family, have allowed family to include homosexual relationships,213
recognizing that these relationships do in fact encourage unity and in-
dividual happiness.21 4 The notion that only the traditional family,
consisting of those related by blood or marriage, encourages unity,
stability, and productivity is outdated and increasingly unrealistic. 215
Social value is not confined solely to the institution of marriage.
"[S]ame-sex and heterosexual couples embody many of the values and
functions of a traditional family,1216 and therefore serve society in the
same way. Many gay men and lesbians have lifelong relationships
with partners who provide psychological and emotional support, func-
tion as an economic unit, and provide an environment for raising chil-
208. See Friedman, supra note 99, at 161-62; Heeb, supra note 85, at 353-54. The
Roe and Eisenstadt decisions focus on an individual's reproductive freedom. There-
fore, denying a homosexual certain rights based on inability to procreate is at odds
with these decisions and the right to privacy. Id. at 386-87.
209. See Friedman, supra note 99, at 161-62; see generally Alexander J. Stuart,
Overpopulation: Twentieth Century Nemesis (1958) (discussing the risks and
problems associated with overpopulation).
210. See Friedman, supra note 99, at 161-62; Heeb, supra note 85, at 387.
211. Libby Post, The Question of Family: Lesbians and Gay Men Reflecting a Rede-
fined Society, 19 Fordham Urb. LJ. 747, 749, 756 (1992); Barbara Kantrowitz, Gay
Families Come Out, Newsweek, Nov. 4, 1996, at 50, 52.
212. See supra part II.B.
213. See supra note 127.
214. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), reh'g
denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
215. See Treuthart, supra note 84, at 96-97. Treuthart discusses a 1989 study done
by the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, in which 1200 random adults
were asked to define "family." Almost 75% of the respondents chose the definition
of "a group of people who love and care for one another" rather than "a group of
people related by blood, marriage, or adoption." Id.
216. Melton, supra note 128, at 499-500 (noting that non-traditional family arrange-
ments, including group living, unmarried heterosexual and homosexual cohabitants,
and single parent families, preserve and encourage socially valuable qualities of fam-
ily including, "support, loyalty, values, welfare and love and affection").
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dren.2 17 These relationships are equally as important to societal
stability and productivity as conventional marital relationships.2 1,
In addition, because promotion of heterosexual marriages is an un-
derlying principle of societal stability,2 19 the state policy should actu-
ally increase the number of heterosexual marriages. 2°0 It is illogical,
however, to assume that more heterosexuals are marrying because
homosexuals are prohibited from doing so,22 1 or that individuals who
would otherwise choose same-sex marriage are instead entering heter-
osexual marriages because same-sex marriages are prohibited.2  Fur-
thermore, when one considers that homosexuals cannot get married,
the promotion of heterosexual marriages under the guise of societal
stability is further jeopardized as a legitimate state policy reason for
protecting marriage. 223 In Marvin v. Marvin,224 the California
Supreme Court stated that granting remedies to nonmarital partners
would not discourage marriage, because "young couples live together
[before marriage] to make sure that they can successfully later under-
take marriage. ' '215 This holds true for homosexuals as well, in that
granting gays and lesbians the right to recover will not discourage
marriage, because gays and lesbians simply cannot currently get
married. 6
Another reason proffered for the state's vigorous protection of
traditional marriage is an interest in heterosexual hegemony, that is,
encouraging heterosexual lifestyles, while discouraging homosexual
lifestyles. This, however, is not a legitimate state purpose. "[T]here is
no reason to believe that allowing same-sex couples to marry would
induce many people to choose same-sex rather than opposite-sex mar-
217. Id. at 500 & n.17 (citing Mary Mendola, The Mendola Report: A New Look
at Gay Couples 197-213 (1980) (discussing long term lesbian and gay relationships));
see Martin, supra note 17, at 1477.
218. See Martin, supra note 17, at 1477; see also Extending Consortium Rights,
supra note 20, at 928-31 (discussing how non-traditional family relationships serve the
same functions and have the same attributes as the traditional family unit).
219. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
220. Boyle, supra note 176, at 131-32.
221. Id at 132 ("There is no evidence that the current and long-standing policy of
promoting marriage by penalizing the unmarried encourages a heterosexual to marry
if he or she was not already so inclined .... ").
222. Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimis-
cegenation Analogy, 25 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 981, 992-93 (1991). The author notes, how-
ever, that there exists no data to directly establish this, because no states currently
recognize same-sex marriages, thus no useful comparison can be made. Id. at 993.
223. See sources cited supra note 173.
224. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
225. Idt at 122.
226. See sources cited supra note 173; see also Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 592
n.2 (Cal. 1988) (en banc) (Broussard, J., dissenting) ("[T]he state's interest in mar-
riage is not advanced by precluding recovery to couples who could not in any case
choose marriage.").
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riage.'"227 In addition, even if discouraging homosexual lifestyles and
homosexual marriage did increase the numbers of heterosexual mar-
riages, it is unlikely that marriages between straight and gay individu-
als would be valuable to society or to the individuals involved.22s Nor
would state recognition of homosexual relationships necessarily pro-
mote immorality, for "according to a variety of theories, homosexual
behavior is morally permissible."' 9 Therefore, discouragement of ho-
mosexual relationship and fear of the state's recognition of such rela-
tionships are not legitimate reasons for touting protection of
traditional marriage as a valid purpose behind denying homosexuals
tort recovery.
If, however, protection of marriage to foster the goals discussed is
found be a legitimate state purpose, denying gays and lesbians the
rights of action for bystander distress and loss of consortium must be
rationally related to this purpose. Depriving homosexuals standing to
assert these causes of action does not further the end of promoting
marriage, because homosexuals are currently unable to get married. 230
Notably, however, a judge in Hawaii has held that the sex-based
classification in the Hawaii Revised Statute section 572-123 1 violates
the equal protection clause of the Hawaiian Constitution insofar as it
is construed to prevent the issuing of a marriage license to a same-sex
couple.232 This established that marriage licenses must be issued to
homosexual couples, thereby allowing them to have a state-recognized
marriage. There are, however, several obstacles to the implementa-
tion of this ruling. First, a stay has been issued pending appealP3
Second, Congress has passed the Defense of Marriage Act,' -  which
227. Strasser, supra note 107, at 976; see also People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941
(N.Y. 1980) ("Certainly there is no ... empirical data submitted which demonstrates
that marriage is nothing more than a refuge for persons deprived by legislative fiat of
the option of consensual sodomy outside the marital bond."), reh'g denied, 420 N.E.2d
412 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
228. Strasser, supra note 107, at 976-77.
229. Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating,
Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 937, 966-67 (1991); see also Common-
wealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980) (stating that morality changes with the
times and social landscape, and "no sufficient state interest justifies legislation of
norms simply because a particular belief is followed by a number of people, or even a
majority").
230. Developments, supra note 8, at 1622 ("[C]ourts would not undermine the
state's interest in promoting traditional marriage by granting gay and lesbian partners
recovery for serious emotional harm caused by tortfeasors.").
231. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1 (1985).
232. Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694942, at "21-22 (Haw. 1st Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1996).
233. Goldberg, supra note 173, at Al. It may be years until the appellate procedure
in this case is exhausted, and the result could very well be that the statute does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaiian Constitution.
234. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199 § 2(a) & 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996) and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996)). Commentators
have expressed serious doubt as to whether the Defense of Marriage Act is constitu-
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provides that no state is required to give effect (that is, full faith and
credit) to any same-sex marriage. Thus, a gay or lesbian couple val-
idly married in Hawaii may not be recognized as married in any other
state that has followed this act. Due to these measures, it seems un-
likely that widespread recognition of same-sex marriage will occur in
the near future. 5 Therefore, because homosexuals cannot get mar-
ried presently, denying them the rights of action for loss of consortium
and bystander distress in the name of protecting marriage is not ra-
tional, and therefore does not pass muster under Romer.
3. Protecting the Functional Family Relationship
Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick,236
stated: "[W]e protect the family because it contributes so powerfully
to the happiness of individuals, not because of a preference for stere-
otypical households. ''1 37 Protecting a functional family unit is a legiti-
mate state purpose, because encouraging a functional family is
"consistent with the policy of encouraging the stabilizing social values
that marriage and the family serve, 2 38 and the traditional family is
not the only relationship that possesses the valuable qualities society
desires.239 The family is a building block of American society,24 0 and
encouragement of the relationships that share the defining character-
istics is beneficial to both the individual and society,24 and is a legiti-
mate state purpose. Precluding a homosexual partner from asserting
claims deriving from injuries to his partner, however, is not rationally
related to this legitimate state purpose. Homosexual couples with sta-
tional. Advocates of same-sex marriage say the Congress cannot legislatively eradi-
cate the full faith and credit cause of the Constitution. Paul Reidinger, Politically
Expedient, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 79. There are also federalism concerns, as mar-
riage is traditionally the province of the states, not the federal government. Id. at 80.
Another compelling argument is that marriages should be treated like divorces and
custody actions, two types of decrees that the Supreme Court has held are entitled to
full faith and credit. See Cynthia M. Reed, When Love, Comity, and Justice Conquer
Borders: In Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 28 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 97, 119-
22 (1996).
235. Goldberg, supra note 173, at Al, A26. Proponents of same-sex marriage, how-
ever, have predicted that the first same-sex wedding will occur in Hawaii during 1997.
Slind-Flor, supra note 173, at A8.
236. 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
237. Id at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
238. Treuthart, supra note 84, at 97. For a discussion of these social values, see
supra part II.C.
239. See Melton, supra note 128, at 499-500.
240. De Burgh v. De Burgh, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (Cal. 1952) (en banc) ("[Flamily is
the basic unit of our society, the center of the personal affections that ennoble and
enrich human life ... it nurtures and develops the individual initiative that distin-
guishes a free people.").
241. See Treuthart, supra note 84, at 98.
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ble and significant relationships are functional families,24 2 and it is il-
logical to contend that these relationships do not satisfy the
relationship requirements because the state is trying to encourage and
protect functional families.
It is the functionalist approach to family, after all, that is perhaps
more consistent with the "policy of encouraging the stabilizing social
values that marriage and the family serve."243 Use of the literal and
traditional definition of family denies benefits and protection to an
ever-increasing segment of society, those who cannot be pigeonholed
into one of these strict categories. 2I Defining family and marriage
using a functionalist approach would do more to promote the underly-
ing values of family, recognizing all socially valuable relationships, not
just those that can be described by the traditional terminology. 45
Even those relationships that can be tagged with a traditional term,
such as a marriage, do not necessarily exhibit the values and stability
that society wants to encourage. Using the formalist definition of
marriage as the standard for determining the social value of a relation-
ship is both overinclusive and underinclusive. It is overinclusive in
that it protects marriages that may not be serving any valuable social
purpose,2' 6 and underinclusive in that it does not recognize those rela-
tionships existing outside of a legal marriage that do encourage socie-
tal values and serve important social purposes.247
An example can clarify the distinction between the functionalist ap-
proach and the formalist approach. Consider two married heterosex-
uals who live apart, are economically independent, share no children,
and give each other no emotional support. Using a formalist defini-
tion, this relationship would qualify as a marriage, and the two parties
would be a family.24 Using a functionalist definition, however, the
relationship may not be deemed a family.249 Furthermore, it is impor-
242. 1& at 96-99; see also Melton, supra note 128, at 517 ("[Courts] will need to
discard previous attitudes of what constitutes a 'family.'... The law should focus on
the societal interests of protecting long-term, supportive relationships.").
243. Treuthart, supra note 84, at 97; see Ettelbrick, supra note 83, at 157.
244. Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 84, at 1644-45; see Swift, supra
note 65, at 588 (noting that many people who consider themselves a family are not so
considered by the law).
245. Treuthart, supra note 84, at 98.
246. An example of this would be a married couple who have lived apart for years,
are economically independent, have no children, but who have not ended the mar-
riage due to religious beliefs. Id.
247. See Martin, supra note 17, at 1485-86.
248. Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 84, at 1644-45.
249. See Treuthart, supra note 84, at 98; see also Looking for a Family Resemblance,
supra note 84, at 1646 (discussing the functionalist approach as considering character-
istics of a relationship to determine if that relationship constitutes a family). Here,
the relationship described between the married couple would carry the formalist term
"marriage," but likely would not serve the emotional and functional purposes of a
nuclear family relationship.
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tant to consider whether this "marriage" is, in fact, serving a socially
productive purpose, or enhancing societal values.
To summarize, the states have advanced only two legitimate state
purposes: limiting liability and protecting a functional family relation-
ship. Denying homosexual lifetime partners the opportunity to assert
a cause of action for loss of consortium or bystander distress, however,
is not rationally related to these legitimate purposes.
IV. PROPOSAL: THE STABLE AND SIGNIFICANT
RELATIONSHIP TEST
To pass the Romer rational relationship test, a limitation must be
established that is rationally related to the legitimate state purposes of
limiting liability and protecting the functionalist family. A stable and
significant relationship test, using the common law criteria of marriage
to determine the stability and significance, would be rationally related
to the need to limit liability and protect the functional family, and
such a relationship between homosexuals would satisfy the relation-
ship requirements for loss of consortium and bystander distress.
A. Criteria of Common Law Marriage: Guidelines to Determine a
Relationship 's Significance and Stability
The criteria to decide the existence of a common law marriage 5s
vary in each jurisdiction recognizing common law marriages.25 The
typical criteria are: (1) an express or implied agreement to be husband
and wife; (2) holding out;252 and (3) cohabitation.25 3 Once the propo-
250. In Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U.S. 423 (1907), the Supreme Court examined the
common law criteria of marriage. The Court stated,
Marriage in fact, as distinguished from a ceremonial marriage, may be
proven in various ways. Of course the best evidence of the exchange of mar-
riage consent between the parties would come from those who were person-
ally present when they mutually agreed to take each other as husband and
wife, and to assume all the responsibilities of that relation.... It may [also]
be shown by [cohabitation and reputation as husband and wife].
Id. at 436.
251. Homer H. Clark, Jr. & Carol Glowinsky, Cases and Problems on Domestic
Relations 95 (5th ed. 1995). Currently, thirteen states and the District of Columbia
recognize common law marriage. Id.
252. Holding out is defined as:
holding forth to the world by the manner of daily life by conduct, demeanor,
and habit, that the man and woman who live together have agreed to take
each other in marriage and to stand in the mutual relation of husband and
wife; and when credit is given by those among whom they live, by their rela-
tives, neighbors, friends, and acquaintances, to these representations and this
continued conduct, then habit and repute arise and attend upon the
cohabitation.
Travers, 205 U.S. at 442.
253. See LeBlanc v. Yawn, 126 So. 789, 790 (Fla. 1930); Eaton v. Johnston, 681 P.2d
606, 608 (Kan. 1984); Russell v. Russell, 865 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. 1993). Eaton also
lists "capacity to marry" as a criteria for common law marriage. Eaton, 681 P.2d at
608. See infra note 255 for a discussion of this factor.
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nents of the marriage have proven cohabitation and holding out, an
implied contract to take each other as husband and wife and a com-
mon law marriage may be inferred. 2-
These same criteria, with appropriate modifications, should be the
standard to determine whether a relationship is stable and significant,
and therefore capable of satisfying the relationship requirements.
These modifications would include focusing on the intent of the par-
ties to coexist as life partners, rather than husband and wife, and elim-
inating any requirement of capacity to marry.255 More specific factors
have been suggested, and are appropriate to the extent they embody
the ideas of cohabitating and holding out. For instance, consideration
of "degree of emotional commitment and interdependence; interwo-
ven social life... financial interdependence... cohabitation; longev-
ity; and exclusivity"" 6 of a relationship would indicate that the
necessary intent, cohabitation, and holding out were part of the
relationship.'
The suggested stable and significant relationship test would there-
fore include gay and lesbian life partners, but would continue to ex-
clude friends, roommates, and distant relatives. This approach
embodies the ideology of Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co."~ and
Butcher v. Superior Court,.59 and the functionalist approach to family.
In addition, this test provides a standard that courts have used, and
laws and guidelines exist to assist in the application of the standard.
Even courts in jurisdictions that do not recognize common law mar-
riage likely have experience in applying the criteria of common law
marriage,"- ° and much case law exists to guide those jurisdictions that
do not have frequent occasion to examine and apply the common law
marriage criteria.
254. Travers, 205 U.S. at 436-37.
255. One necessary modification would be to eliminate "capacity to marry" as a
criterion where that is required. See Eaton, 681 P.2d at 608. This is not a major obsta-
cle, as this Note is not arguing that homosexuals contract common law marriages.
This Note suggests that the applicable criteria, which are holding out and cohabita-
tion, be used to determine a stable and significant relationship.
256. See Post, supra note 211, at 749-50.
257. The presence of sexual relations could also be an important factor, but this
could be problematic, for in some states sexual relations between members of the
same sex is a crime. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187-88, reh'g denied, 478
U.S. 1039 (1986). In addition, the presence or absence of sexual relations is not neces-
sarily a defining characteristic of a marriage.
258. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
259. 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1983), overruled by Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d
582 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
260. See, e.g., In re Estate of Watts, 294 N.E.2d 195, 197-98 (N.Y. 1973) (applying
Florida law to determine if a common law marriage entered into in Florida would be
recognized as valid in New York). But see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294
F.2d 500, 504-05 (3d Cir. 1961) (holding that New Jersey would not recognize a com-
mon law marriage of another jurisdiction, therefore New Jersey courts do not have
the opportunity to apply common law marriage criteria).
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B. Application of the Romer Rational Relationship Test to the
Stable and Significant Relationship Test
The stable and significant relationship test, guided by the criteria of
common law marriage, is rationally related to limiting liability and
promoting and protecting the functional family, and therefore con-
forms with the Supreme Court's decision in Romer. Genuine con-
cerns exist regarding widening circles of liability. It is impracticable
and unreasonable to permit everyone who witnesses an accident to
recover for bystander liability, or to let someone recover for loss of
consortium of a person she barely knows.26' Courts have responded
to these concerns with judicially created classifications to limit the
number of possible plaintiffs, and have determined that a relationship
requirement is necessary to limit recovery to those who have suffered
a real and legitimate loss.2 62 The stable and significant relationship
test would maintain fairly strict limits on which relationships merit re-
covery, but would allow individuals the opportunity to prove that their
relationship deserves recovery.26 3 In addition, satisfaction of the rela-
tionship requirements would not automatically permit the plaintiff to
recover, as the plaintiff would still need to prove foreseeability and
that defendant owed him a duty.261
The stable and significant relationship test is also rationally related
to the protection and promotion of the functional family relationship.
Indeed, the terms "stable and significant relationship" and "functional
family" are essentially synonymous,2 65 evidenced by a case such as
Braschi. 66 Recognizing the validity of the stable and significant rela-
tionship as a close relationship that satisfies the relationship prongs of
loss of consortium and both the zone of danger and bystander proxim-
ity approaches to bystander distress would provide support to those
who "function as a family by caring for and supporting one another on
a daily basis. '267 The value of the family is "encouragement of stable,
affectionate, and economically efficient human relationships. '268 The
261. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
263. The advocated stable and significant relationship test would allow the "life
partners" in Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 874, 876-78 (Ct. App. 1987), to satisfy
the relationship requirement, but would still exclude a friendship like that asserted in
Carlson v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 520 N.W.2d 534,538 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (hold-
ing a young woman could not recover for bystander distress suffered from witnessing
the death of her best friend in a car accident).
264. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 110-14, 111-24 and accompanying text for discussions of how
these terms are defined and used in this context.
266. 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989). See supra note 127 for other cases demon-
strating the similarity in meaning of these terms.
267. Ettelbrick, supra note 83, at 122; see also Post, supra note 211, at 749
("[L]esbian and gay families reflect the same love and commitment as their hetero-
sexual counterparts.").
268. Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 84, at 1647-48.
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stable and significant relationship recognizes this, and is at least ra-
tionally related to accomplishing this end.
CONCLUSION
Currently, no jurisdiction allows homosexuals the right of action for
bystander distress or loss of consortium, when the injured party is his
or her life partner, because these same-sex relationships are not
deemed to satisfy the respective relationship requirements of these
torts. The Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans69 dictates the
use of a rational relationship test when disparate treatment is predi-
cated on a classification based on sexual orientation.270 In those juris-
dictions that recognize loss of consortium and bystander distress,
precluding homosexuals from asserting the causes of action is a denial
of equal protection that violates the Romer rational relationship test.
Of the state purposes advanced in support of denying the rights of
action, the only truly legitimate purposes are limiting liability and pro-
tecting and promoting functional family relationships. Denying gays
and lesbians the right of action, however, is not rationally related to
these purposes. In contrast, a stable and significant relationship test,
using the criteria of a common law marriage to determine the stability
and significance, will provide equal protection in compliance with
Romer. This test would allow homosexuals with socially valuable rela-
tionships standing to recover for injury to their partners, equivalent to
the benefits and protection afforded similarly situated heterosexuals.
269. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
270. 1& at 1627.
1997] 2683

